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Abstract—The secure transmission of confidential informa-
tion in cellular vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X) communication
networks is vitally important for user’s personal safety. How-
ever, for C-V2X there have not been much studies on the
physical layer security (PLS). Since artificial noise (AN) and
secure beamforming are popular PLS techniques for cellular
communications, in this paper we investigate the potential of
these PLS techniques for enhancing the security of C-V2X
networks. In particular, leveraging stochastic geometry, we study
the PLS of an AN assisted C-V2X network, where the locations
of legitimate vehicular nodes, malicious vehicular nodes and
road side units (RSUs) are modeled by Cox processes driven
by a common Poisson line process (PLP), and the locations of
cellular base stations (BSs) are modeled by a two-dimensional
(2D) Poisson point process (PPP). Based on the maximum signal-
to-interference-ratio (SIR) association scheme, we calculate the
coverage probability of the network. We also derive bounds
on the secrecy probability, which are validated by simulation
results. Moreover, we obtain an analytical result of the effective
secrecy throughput for characterizing the reliability and security
of wiretap channels. Simulation results are given to validate the
analytical result, and provide interesting insights into the impact
of network parameters on the achievable secrecy performance.
Simulation results show that a larger array antenna can provide
a better robustness of the secure transmission strategy, and the
optimal power allocation ratio between confidential information
and AN remains almost unchanged for different numbers of
antennas.
Index Terms—Vehicle-to-everything, physical layer security,
secrecy beamforming, artificial noise, stochastic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, including
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I),
vehicle-to-network (V2N), and vehicle-to-pedestrians (V2P),
is a key technology for pushing intelligent transportation
systems (ITS) forward and improving road traffic safety. In
general, there are two key radio access technologies (RATs)
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for V2X, including dedicated short range communications
(DSRC) and cellular-V2X (C-V2X). It is known that, C-V2X
has been developed by 3GPP in its Rel. 14 [1], operating in the
cellular operators’ licensed spectrum under the existing LTE
system architectures. Nevertheless, C-V2X communications
have faced huge secrecy challenges, i.e., not only incurring
the confidential information leakage, but also endangering
the personal safety of users, since the information about
identifications, positions, and trajectories of users could
be exposed to track vehicles easier [2]. However, as pointed
out by [2], 3GPP specifications provide few mechanisms for
securing C-V2X communications. Thus, more research efforts
should be devoted to a new C-V2X security arrangement [3].
A. Related Works
For C-V2X communications, there are two widely-used
secure transmission strategies [4]: key-based cryptography
technologies [5] and physical layer security (PLS) techniques
[6]–[9]. Key-based cryptography technologies guarantee com-
munication security at upper layers, which introduce much
communication overhead due to the key distribution. For
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, the computational and
network resources for carrying out the key negotiation are
high. These issues make the key management of cryptography
technologies become more challenging for delay-sensitive C-
V2X applications [7]. In addition, with the development of
powerful computers, especially quantum computers, traditional
cryptography technologies will be vulnerable to brute-force at-
tacks in the near future, which may lead to security vulnerabil-
ity in future C-V2X systems [10]. Different from cryptography
technologies, PLS technologies exploit characteristics of wire-
less medium to design transmission strategies at the physical
layer for improving the communication security [8], which do
not rely on the computational complexity and do not need
trusted authority and tamper-proof devices [6], [9]. Therefore,
compared with cryptography technologies, the implementation
complexity and network overhead of PLS technologies are
both much lower, which makes the PLS technology be an
effective measure for improving the security of delay-sensitive
C-V2X applications [9], [11]. A comprehensive overview on
PLS assisted vehicle networks was given in [9]. The secrecy
rate maximization of underlaying V2V communications has
2been studied in [11]. But, until now, there has been no study
investigating the aggregate network performance of C-V2X
secure communications [12].
Generally, there are two popular approaches for investigat-
ing the aggregate network performance, including system-level
simulations and stochastic geometry. In [13], a system-level
simulation based approach has been adopted for studying the
performance of C-V2X, which, however, is time-consuming
and lacks of analytical expressions. In contrast, stochastic
geometry based approaches can give an elegant analytical
result, thereby facilitating the analysis of the effect of network
parameters on the network performance. Thus, it has been
widely used for evaluating the performance of a heterogeneous
cellular network [14]. Recently, the stochastic geometry-based
approach for evaluating the network performance of C-V2X
communications is gaining the attention. For example, in [15],
the Poisson line process (PLP) was used to model the spatial
distributions of roads, and a one-dimensional (1D) Poisson
point process (PPP) was adopted for modeling the spatial
distribution of the network nodes on each road, e.g., vehicular
nodes and road side units (RSUs). A tractable framework for
characterizing the downlink coverage performance of urban
millimeter wave vehicular networks has been given in [16].
Employing the Poisson Cox point process model, a tractable
analytical framework for analyzing the downlink communica-
tion of cellular networks leveraging vehicles has been given
in [17].
All of the works mentioned above have not addressed the
security of C-V2X networks. Using stochastic geometry, the
PLS of wireless communications has been widely studied from
the viewpoint of the network, but most of the works focused on
cellular communications. Moreover, the PLS of the artificial
noise (AN) aided ad hoc network has been studied in [18],
where the secrecy throughput of sectoring and beamforming
strategies was investigated. The work [19] has analyzed the
secure connectivity probability and secrecy throughput of the
AN-assisted millimeter wave network.
B. Motivations and Contributions
To our knowledge, there are no published references that
study the PLS of multi-antenna C-V2X communications from
the viewpoint of the network. In this paper, we aim to
provide an analytical framework to study the PLS of multi-
antenna C-V2X networks using the stochastic geometry
approach. It is to study the potential of the AN aided multi-
antenna secure transmission strategy for improving the
PLS of C-V2X networks. Our contributions are summarized
as follows.
1) We build an analytical model for analyzing the PLS of the
multi-antenna C-V2X network, where the spatial distributions
of legitimate vehicular nodes, RSUs and malicious vehicular
eavesdroppers (Eves) on roads are modeled by Cox processes
with a common PLP, and the spatial distributions of cellular
base stations (BSs) and cellular users are modeled by indepen-
dent two-dimensional (2D) PPPs. With such models, we study
the potential of the multi-antenna technique for enhancing the
PLS of C-V2X networks, where AN is adopted for disturbing
randomly located Eves.
2) We analyze the coverage probability of the multi-antenna
C-V2X network. Different from cellular networks, the char-
acteristics of future C-V2X services can be summarized as
extremely high data rates, high reliability, and low latency,
due to the requirements of self-driving autonomous cars.
Therefore, the max signal-to-interference-ratio (SIR) associ-
ation policy is adopted in this paper. Although the exact
analytical result is difficult to obtain due to the coupling
interference at the receiver, an approximate analytical result of
the coverage probability is obtained by employing the bound
on the distribution of gamma random variable. Furthermore,
asymptotic analytical results show that the Laplace transform
of the interference power converges to a 2D PPP model.
3) We analyze the secrecy probability of the multi-antenna
C-V2X network, which is defined as the probability that the
maximum SIR of multiple Eves is below a threshold. Although
it is challenging to obtain the exact analytical result, we
derive lower and upper bounds on the secrecy probability. In
addition, asymptotic analytical results show that the probabil-
ity distribution function (pdf) of the minimum distance from
multiple Eves to the typical transmitter converges to a 2D
PPP model. Simulation results show that the lower bound is
very tight. Meanwhile, we introduce a secrecy performance
metric, namely effective secrecy throughput for quantifying
the average data rate of the confidential information that
is securely transmitted, which characterizes the tradeoff be-
tween reliable transmission (coverage probability) and secure
transmission (secrecy probability).
4) We evaluate the impact of the key parameters on the
effective secrecy throughput of the network, including the
number of transmit antennas, the power allocation coefficient
between AN and confidential signals, and the intensity of
network nodes, etc. We observe that increasing the number of
antennas not only improves the effective secrecy throughput,
but also increases the robustness of the AN-assisted secure
transmission strategy. Simulation results show that the ef-
fective secrecy throughput may be a concave/quasi-concave
function of the power allocation ratio, and the optimal power
allocation ratio remains almost unchanged with different num-
bers of antennas.
Notation: x ∼ gamma(k,m) denotes the gamma-distributed
random variable with shape k and scalem. x ∼ exp(b) denotes
that x is an exponential random variable whose mean is b.
x ∼ CN (Λ,∆) denotes the circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian vector with the mean vectorΛ and covariance matrix
∆. The factorial of a non-negative integer n is denoted by
n!. Γ(x) is the gamma function.
(
n
k
)
= n!(n−k)!k! . || · ||F
denotes the Frobenius norm. LX(s) denotes the Laplace
transform of X , i.e., E
(
e−sX
)
, Cn×n stands for a n × n
complex matrix. Besides the notations mentioned above, some
important notations are summarized in Table I.
3II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the multi-antenna C-V2X communication net-
work, which consists of vehicular nodes, RSUs, macro base
stations (MBSs), cellular users, and passive Eves. In the
network, there are different types of transmissions, including
V2V, V2N, V2P, and V2I, etc. Without loss of generality,
malicious vehicular nodes or malicious cellular users could
play as Eves for wiretapping the privacy-sensitive information.
As we know, for C-V2X communications, the vehicular safety
applications require high-reliable and high-capacity communi-
cations. In addition, with the increasing amount of automation
in vehicles, the requirements of the C-V2X communications
become increasingly high. Therefore, compared with the cellu-
lar communications, the C-V2X communications need higher
wireless link quality [2], which is dominated by the received
SIR. Therefore, we employ the max-SIR association policy
suggested by [20], for characterizing the maximum secrecy
performance, where the user is associated with the BS that
provides the maximum SIR. Note that, we only consider the
case that the SIR threshold above 0 dB for studying the
coverage probability in order to meet the requirements of
vehicular communications and we ignore other trivial cases.
A. Spatial Modeling
Fig. 1 gives a realization of the stochastic geometry model
for secure transmissions in C-V2X networks. We assume that
each transmitter is equipped withN antennas, and all of the re-
ceivers and Eves are all equipped with a single antenna. All the
cellular MBSs, legitimate cellular users and malicious cellular
users are termed as planar transmitters, planar receivers,
and planar Eves, which are, respectively, modeled by three
independent PPPs, Φb, Φu, Φe with intensities λb, λu, λe.
Further, all the legitimate vehicular nodes, malicious vehicular
nodes, and RSUs are modeled by Cox point processes driven
by a common PLP. The spatial distribution of roads is modeled
by a motion-invariant PLP Φl with line intensity λl, which is
produced by a 2D PPP Ξl with intensity ul =
λl
π
, on the
TABLE I
LIST OF SOME IMPORTANT NOTATIONS
Symbols Description
Φb,Φu,Φe Planar transmitters, planar receivers, and
planar Eves
Ψb,Ψu,Ψe Vehicular transmitters, vehicular receivers,
and vehicular Eves
Φl Poisson line process
ψb(l) Vehicular transmitters on the road l
ψu(l) Vehicular receivers on the road l
ψe(l) Vehicular eavesdroppers on the road l
λb, λu, λe, λl Intensities of Φb,Φu,Φe,Φl
ub, uu, ue Intensities of ψb(l), ψu(l), ψe(l)
φ Power allocation ratio between confiden-
tial information and artificial noise.
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Fig. 1. Stochastic geometry-based model of the C-V2X secure transmission
in a circular simulation window with radius 3km, road (blue line), vehicular
transmitters (green triangles), planar transmitters (cyan squares), planar Eves
(pink pentagrams), and vehicular Eves (black squares) with intensity λl =
10−3/m, λb = 10
−6/m2,λe = 10−6/m2, ub = 10
−3/m,ue = 10−3/m.
representation space. The mathematical preliminary about the
PLP can be found in [15], [17]. The road lr,θ is uniquely
parameterized by a point (r, θ) of Ξl. As shown by Fig. 1,
r denotes the perpendicular distance of the road from the
origin, while θ denotes the angle between the positive x-axis
and the perpendicular line from the origin to the road in the
counter clockwise direction. In this case, the distance ρ from
the vehicular Eve on the road to the origin is ρ =
√
r2 + t2.
On the other hand, all the transmitters, including vehicular
nodes and RSUs, on each road l ∈ Φl are termed as vehicular
transmitters, which are modeled by a homogeneous 1D PPPs
ψb(l) with the intensity ub. All the legitimate and malicious
receivers, including vehicular nodes and RSUs, on each road
are termed as vehicular receivers and vehicular Eves, which
are modeled by independent homogeneous 1D PPPs ψu(l),
ψe(l) with intensities uu, ue, respectively. We denote the
set of the vehicular Eves, vehicular users, and vehicular
transmitters by Ψe = {ψe(l)}l∈Φl , Ψu = {ψu(l)}l∈Φl , and
Ψb = {ψb(l)}l∈Φl , respectively.
B. AN Assisted Secure Transmission
Employing the PLS technique, each transmitter sends AN
along with the confidential information for confusing the po-
tential Eves [21]. Assume that the perfect CSI of the intended
receiver is available at each transmitter, which adopts the
maximum ratio transmission (MRT) strategy for transmitting
the confidential information while sending AN uniformly in
the null-space of the intended channel [18].
Specially, let us denote the intended channel of the trans-
mitter at x ∈ R2 as fx ∈ CN×1 which is a complex
Gaussian random vector obeying CN (0, IN). Its null-space
is Wx ∈ CN×(N−1). Hence, the signal vector yx transmitted
4from the transmitter located at x is
yx =
√
φPt
fx
||fx||F s+
√
(1− φ)Pt
(N − 1) Wxna, (1)
where s is the confidential signal. In addition, we have the
following notations: na ∈ C(N−1)×1 is the AN vector, which
is a complex Gaussian random vector obeying CN (0, IN−1),
Pt is the total transmit power at the transmitter, φ is the power
allocation ratio. In this paper, we consider the interference-
limited scenario, where the thermal noise is ignored due to
the aggregate interference, which is a common assumption
adopted by the existing works on the cellular network analysis
using stochastic geometry [18]. For brevity, we set Pt = 1.
C. Wiretap Coding and Secrecy Performance Metric
Prior to the transmission, the confidential information is
encoded with Wyner code [22], and we adopt the nonadaptive
encoder with the fixed codeword rate Rb, and the confidential
information rate Rs [23]. Hence, the rate redundancy Re ,
Rb −Rs is added intentionally for protecting the confidential
information against malicious eavesdropping. We focus on
the slow-fading scenario, where the coherence time of the
channel is much longer than the symbol duration1. Suggested
by [18], [19], [24], we employ a probabilistic secrecy perfor-
mance measure, namely the effective secrecy throughput,
which quantifies the average confidential data rate transmitted
securely from each transmitter to its intended user. Before
proceeding, the following definitions are introduced.
• Coverage probability: When the capacity of the legiti-
mate link can support the code rate Rb, the coverage can
be guaranteed, and the legitimate receiver can decode the
signals with negligible errors. The coverage probability is
defined as pc , Pr (SIRu ≥ γ), where SIRu is the SIR
received at the typical user and Rb = log (1 + γ). Com-
pared with traditional cellular users, C-V2X terminals
will demand a higher link quality to ensure the vehicular
safety, such as the control information transmission for
automatic driving, etc. Hence, we only consider the SIR
threshold γ > 0 dB, which fits into most cases of the
future C-V2X networks.
• Secrecy probability: When the capacity of the eaves-
dropping link is below the code rate Re, the security of
the confidential information can be guaranteed, and Eve
can not decode the confidential information. The secrecy
probability is defined as psec , Pr (maxe SIRe ≤ β),
wheremaxe SIRe is the maximal SIR received at multiple
Eves and Re = log (1 + β).
We adopt the effective secrecy throughput given in [24,
Definition 1] for characterizing the network security. For the
self-containedness, its definition is given as follows:
Definition 1: The effective secrecy throughput is defined as
η , Rspcpsec = (log (1 + γ)− log (1 + β)) pcpsec. (2)
1Such assumption holds in low-mobility scenarios, such as C-V2X com-
munications in an urban setting
D. Some Important Laplace Transforms
In order to carry out the coverage probability and secrecy
probability analysis, one should have the knowledge about the
Laplace transforms of the interference power originating from
different types of transmitters.
Lemma 1: Denoting ζx as the equivalent channel gain from
the transmitter at x to the typical receiver at the origin and
α > 2 as the path loss exponent, the Laplace transforms of the
interference power received by the typical receiver located at
the origin, originating from the set of vehicular transmitters
Ψb, from the set of planar transmitters Φb, and from the set
of the vehicular transmitters on the road at a distance r,
i.e., ψb(lr), are, respectively, given by
LΨb(s) , E
(
exp
(
−
∑
x∈Ψb
sζxD
−α
xo
))
=e
−2λl
∫ +∞
0
(
1−e
−2ub
∫+∞
0
(
1−Lζx
(
s(r2b+t2b)
−α
2
))
dtb
)
drb
, (3)
LΦb(s) , E
(
exp
(
−
∑
x∈Φb
sζxD
−α
xo
))
=exp
(−λbπE (ζδx)Γ(1− δ)sδ) , (4)
Lψ(lr)(s),E

exp

− ∑
x∈ψb(lr)
sζxD
−α
xe




=exp
(
−2ub
∫ +∞
0
(
1− Lζx
(
s
(
r2 + t2b
)−α2 )) dtb) . (5)
Proof: The proof of the Laplace transform (3) is given as
E
(
exp
(
−
∑
x∈Ψb
sζxD
−α
xo
))
=E

 ∏
(rb,θb)∈Ξl
E

 ∏
tb∈ψ(lr,θ)
exp
(
−sζx
(
r2b + t
2
b
)−α2 )


(a)
= e
−2λl
∫+∞
0
(
1−e
−2ub
∫+∞
0
(
1−Eζx
(
exp
(
−sζx(r2b+t2b)
−α
2
)))
dtb
)
drb
=e
−2λl
∫ +∞
0
(
1−e
−2ub
∫+∞
0
(
1−Lζx
(
s(r2b+t2b)
−α
2
))
dtb
)
drb
, (6)
where, step (a) is obtained by using the PGFL of ψ(lr,θ) and
the PGFL of Ξl [25, Theorem 4.9]. The Laplace transform (4)
can be obtained with [14, eq. (8)]. The Laplace transform (5)
can be obtained with the PGFL of the point process ψb(lr,θ)
The following lemma gives asymptotic analytical results of
Laplace transforms in Lemma 1 under the assumption that
λl → +∞, ub → 0, and the product λlub remains constant.
Lemma 2: With λl → +∞, ub → 0, and λlub = λ¯, we
5have the following asymptotic results
lim
λl→+∞,ub→0
LΨb(s) = e−2πλ¯
∫
+∞
0
(
1−Lζx(sr
−α
2 )
)
rdr
, (7)
lim
ub→0
Lψ(lr)(s) = 1. (8)
Proof: Denoting the inner integral term in (3) as Q(rb) =∫ +∞
0
(
1− Lζx
(
s
(
r2b + t
2
b
)−α2 )) dtb > 0 and employing the
inequality 1 + x < ex, we have
0 < 2λl
(
1− exp
(
−2 λ¯
λl
Q(rb)
))
< 2λ¯Q(rb). (9)
It can be proved that
∫ +∞
0
2λ¯Q(rb)drb =
E
(
(sζx)
2
α
)
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
< +∞. Therefore, we can claim
that 2λl
(
1− exp
(
−2 λ¯
λl
Q(rb)
))
is dominated by the
integrable function 2λ¯Q(rb). Using the Lebesgue’s dominated
convergence theorem [26], we can obtain (10) at the top of
the next page. Then, employing the L’Hospital’s rule, ̟ in
(10) can be derived as ̟ = 4λ¯Q(rb). Then, the asymptotic
analytical result of LΨb(s) can be further derived as
lim
λl→+∞,ub→0
LΨb(s) = exp
(
−4λ¯
∫ +∞
0
Q(rb)drb
)
(a)
= exp
(
−4λ¯
∫ pi
2
0
dθ
∫ +∞
0
(
1− Lζx(sr−
α
2 )
)
rdr
)
= exp
(
−2πλ¯
∫ +∞
0
(
1− Lζx(sr−
α
2 )
)
rdr
)
, (11)
where step (a) is obtained due to the polar coordinate trans-
formation and the fact that the integral interval is [0,+∞]×
[0,+∞].
Applying ub → 0 on the expression of Lψ(lr)(s) given in
(5), we have limub→0 Lψ(lr)(s) = 1.
Remark 1: From Lemma 2, the asymptotic result of the
Laplace transform of the total interference power originating
from vehicular networks is
exp
(
−2λ¯π
∫ +∞
0
(
1− Lζx(sr−
α
2 )
)
rdr
)
(12)
Comparing (12) with [27, eq. (8)], we can conclude that
the Laplace transform of the interference power originating
from vehicular networks converges to the one of the network
modeled by a 2D PPP with intensity λ¯.
With the Slivnyak’s theory [25], we put a node at the origin,
called the typical node to evaluate the coverage probability
and secrecy probability. In such case, the typical node can be,
either a vehicular node or a planar node. For the vehicular
nodes, the road and the vehicular node are coupled, since
every vehicular node should be on a road. The typical road
is the one where the typical vehicular node locates at. When
selecting a typical vehicular node, with Palm probability, the
coverage and secrecy probability analysis should be performed
over the conditional point process distribution given that a
road exists at a specific location. By contrast, when selecting
a typical planar node, we only need to consider an uncondi-
tional point process. Therefore, the coverage probability and
secrecy probability of a typical vehicular node are different
from the ones of a typical planar node, which will be analyzed
in more detail in the forthcoming sections.
III. COVERAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSES
In this section, we analyze the coverage probability of
the C-V2X network. Without loss of generality, we shift the
coordinate system to put the typical user at the origin. Since
each transmitter adopts MRT, the SIR received by the typical
user from the transmitter located at x is
SIRx =
φ||fx||2FD−αxo∑
y∈Σb/x
PyD
−α
yo
, (13)
where Σb is the set of interfering transmitters, and Dyo is
the distance from the transmitter at y to the typical user.
In (13), Py , fHy
(
φfxf
H
x
||fx||2F
+
(1−φ)WxW
H
x
N−1
)
fy denotes the
interference power received at the typical user from the
interfering transmitter at y ∈ R2. Since fx ∼ CN (0, IN ),
||fx||2F ∼ Gamma (N, 1), and the pdf of Py has been given
in [18, Lemma 1].
The coverage probability under the max-SIR connectivity
model can be expressed as
pc = Pr
(
max
x∈Σb
SIRx ≥ γ
)
. (14)
Before commencing the coverage probability analysis, let us
give the following corollary referring to the Laplace transforms
of the interference power from three types of transmitters.
Corollary 1: The Laplace transforms of the interference
power received by the typical user at the origin, originating
from the set of vehicular transmittersΨb, from the set of planar
transmitters Φb, and from the set of vehicular transmitters
ψb(lr) on the road with the perpendicular distance r, are,
respectively, given as
LcΨb(s) = e−2λl
∫+∞
0
(1−Υu(rb))drb , (15)
LcΦb(s) = exp
(−λbπω(φ)Γ(1 − δ)sδ) , (16)
Lcψ(lr)(s) = e
−2ub
∫+∞
0
(
1− 1
Π(r2+t2b)
)
dtb
, (17)
where
Υu(rb) , exp
(
−2ub
∫ +∞
0
(
1− 1
Π (r2b + t
2
b)
)
dtb
)
, (18)
Π(x)=

(1+(1− φ)s (x)−α2
N − 1
)N−1(1+φs (x)−α2 ), (19)
ω(φ) =
{
ω1(φ), if φ =
1
N
,
ω2(φ), Otherwise.
6lim
λl→+∞,ub→0
LΨb(s)=exp

−
∫ +∞
0
lim
λl→+∞
2λl
(
1− exp
(
−2 λ¯
λl
Q(rb)
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸ drb
̟

 (10)
where ω1(φ) =
φ
2
α Γ(N+ 2α)
Γ(N) , and
ω2(φ) =
1
φ
(
N − φ−1
N − 1
)1−N (
φ1+
2
αΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)
−
(
1− φ
N − 1
)1+ 2α N−2∑
k=0
(
N − φ−1
N − 1
)k Γ (k + 1 + 2
α
)
Γ (k + 1)
)
. (21)
Proof: Since
fHy fxf
H
x fy
||fx||2F
∼ exp(1) and f
H
y WxW
H
x fy
N−1 ∼
gamma (N − 1, 1) [28], using the Laplace transforms of ex-
ponential and gamma random variables, the proof of (15) and
(17) can be achieved directly by employing the equations (3)
and (5) in Lemma 1, which is omitted for brevity.
For proving (16), with the equation (4) in Lemma 1, we
have LcΦb(s)=exp
(−λbπE (P δy )Γ(1− δ)sδ) , and with [18,
Lemma 1], E
(
P δy
)
can be obtained as ω(φ) given in (20).
In the following subsections, we consider the typical user
as a planar node and vehicular node, respectively, to derive
the analytical result of the coverage probability in (14).
A. Coverage Probability of the Typical Planar Receiver
In this subsection, we consider the scenario where a planar
node seating at the origin, plays as the typical user. Further,
the types of serving transmitters being independent with each
other can be classified into: a) the set of planar transmitters
denoted as Φb, and b) the set of vehicular transmitters denoted
as Ψb. In this case, the coverage probability of the typical
planar receiver is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Under the max-SIR connectivity model and γ >
1, the coverage probability of the typical planar receiver, pˆc,p
is given by (22) at the top of the next page.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Although the analytical result given in Theorem 1 is exact,
it is not easy for the numerical calculation, which motivates
us to derive a more easy-to-use expression in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2: Under the max-SIR connectivity model and γ >
1, the coverage probability of the typical planar receiver, pˆc,p
can be approximated as pc,p in (23) at the top of the next page,
where κ = (N !)−
1
N .
Proof: The result in (23) can be obtained directly by using
the tight lower bound on the cdf of the gamma random variable
x with the scale parameter 1 and shape parameter N , i..e.,
Pr (x ≤ y) ' (1− e−κy)N [29].
B. Coverage Probability of the Typical Vehicular Receiver
In this subsection, we consider the scenario where a ve-
hicular node seating at the origin, plays as the typical user,
and the road passes through the origin with r = 0 and
θ = 0, since the PLP is rotation-invariant. Further, the types
of serving transmitters being independent with each other
can be classified into: a) the planar transmitters denoted
as Φb; b) the vehicular transmitters denoted as Ψb, and c)
the vehicular transmitters on the road lo denoted as ψ(lo).
The coverage probability of the typical planar receiver is
given in the following theorem. Compared with the typical
planar receiver case, the additional road lo increases the
set of serving transmitters by ψb(lo), due to the Palm
distributions.
Theorem 3: Under the max-SIR connectivity model and γ >
1, the coverage probability of the typical vehicular receiver,
pˆc,v can be approximated by pc,v in (24) at the top of the next
page.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
Finally, with Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, the coverage
probability of the typical user is obtained by employing the
total probability law and Palm probability [25], which is given
as follows.
Corollary 2: With γ > 1, the coverage probability of the
typical user can be approximated as
pc ≈ κppc,p + κvpc,v, (25)
where κp , λuλu+uuλl denotes the probability that the typical
user is a planar node, and κv , uuλlλu+uuλl denotes the
probability that the typical user is a vehicular node.
IV. SECRECY PROBABILITY ANALYSES
In this section, we investigate the secrecy probability of
a typical transmitter and receiver pair. We consider the non-
colluding Eve case, and the secrecy probability is defined as
the probability that the maximal SIR received by Eves is below
β, which is the SIR threshold for the secrecy outage.
We denote the channel vector between the transmitter lo-
cated at x and the Eve located at e as hxe ∈ CN×1, which
is a complex Gaussian random vector obeying CN (0, IN ).
Since the N × N matrix Ux ,
[
fx
||fx||F
,Wx
]
is unitary, the
1×N vector hHxeUx =
[
qe,g
H
xe
]
where the scalar qe ,
hHxefx
||fx||F
and the 1× (N − 1) vector gHxe , hHxeWx, have independent
identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian entries each
with variance 1. Therefore, we have |qe|2 ∼ exp(1) and
||gxe||2F ∼ gamma (N − 1, 1) [28]. As done in [18], [19],
we consider the worst case by overestimating the multiuser
decodability of the spatially-distributed Eves. In particular,
each Eve can estimate the CSI of the cascaded channel hxefx||fx||F
7pˆc,p = EΦb,Ψb
( ∑
x∈Φb+Ψb
Pr (SIRx ≥ γ)
)
=2πλb
∫ +∞
0
rdr
N−1∑
n=0
[
(−sp)n
n!
dn
dsnp
(LcΨb(sp)LcΦb (sp))
]
sp=γrαφ−1
+ 4λlub
∫ +∞
0
drb
∫ +∞
dtb
[
N−1∑
k=0
(−sv)p
p!
dp
ds
p
v
(
LcΦb (sv)Lcψ(lr=rb )(sv)(sv)L
c
Ψb(sv)
)]
sv=φ−1(r2b+t2b)
α
2 γ
. (22)
pˆc,p / pc,p = 2πλb
N∑
n=1
(
N
n
)
(−1)n+1
∫ +∞
0
rdr LcΨb(nκsp)LcΦb(nκsp)
∣∣
sp=γrαφ−1
+ 4λlub
N∑
n=1
(
N
n
)
(−1)n+1
∫ +∞
0
drb
∫ +∞
dtb LcΦb (κnsv)Lcψ(lr=rb)(κnsv)L
c
Ψb (κnsv)
∣∣∣
sv=φ−1(r2b+t2b)
α
2 γ
, (23)
pˆc,v/pc,v = 2πλb
N∑
n=1
(
N
n
)
(−1)n+1
∫ +∞
0
rdr LcΨb(nκsp)LcΦb (nκsp)Lcψ(lr=0) (κnsp)
∣∣∣
sp=γrαφ−1
+ 4λlub
N∑
n=1
(
N
n
)
(−1)n+1
∫ +∞
0
drb
∫ +∞
dtb LcΦb (κnsv)LcΨb (κnsv)Lcψ(lr=rb) (κnsv)L
c
ψ(lr=0)
(κnsv)
∣∣∣
sv=φ−1(r2b+t2b)
α
2 γ
+ 2ub
N∑
n=1
(
N
n
)
(−1)n+1
∫ +∞
0
dtb LcΨb(nκslo)LcΦb (nκslo)Lcψ(lr=0) (κnslo)
∣∣∣
slo=φ
−1tαb γ
. (24)
perfectly from the pilots transmitted from each legitimate
transmitter, and adopt the successive interference cancellation
(SIC) technique to subtract other users’ information signals
from the aggregate received signal, for reducing the received
interference power and improving its wiretapping capability.
Hence, when Eves try to wiretap the confidential information
from the typical user, Eves only suffer the interference from
the AN under the worst-case assumption.
Without loss of generality, we shift the coordinate sys-
tem to put the typical transmitter at the origin. Since the
symbol duration is much smaller than the coherence time of
the channel, similar to [18], [19], the SIR received by the
Eve at e is given by SIRe ,
φ|qe|
2D−αoe
(1−φ)
N−1
||goe||2FD
−α
oe +Ie
, where,
(1−φ)
N−1 ||goe||2FD−αoe denotes the interference power originating
from the typical transmitter, and Ie =
∑
x∈Σb
(1−φ)
N−1 ||gxe||2FD−αxe
is the interference power received at the Eve from the set of
transmitters, Σb. The mathematical definition of the secrecy
probability psec is given as
psec , Pr
(
max
e∈Σe
SIRe ≤ β
)
, (26)
where Σe denotes the set of Eves. Before proceeding, the
Laplace transforms of the interference from three types of
transmitters are given in the following corollary.
Corollary 3: The Laplace transforms of the interference
power received at the Eve from multiple vehicular transmitters,
from planar transmitters and from vehicular transmitters on the
road with the perpendicular distance r from the Eve, are given,
respectively, as follows
LsΦb(s)=e−λbπΓ(N−1+δ)Γ(1−δ)(Γ(N−1))
−1sδ , (27)
LsΨb(s)=e−2λl
∫+∞
0
(1−Υe(rb))drb , (28)
Lsψ(lr)(s) = e
−2ub
∫
+∞
0
(
1−
(
1+s(r2+t2b)
−α
2
)1−N)
dtb
. (29)
where
Υe(rb) , exp

−2ub ∫ +∞
0

1−
(
1+
s
(r2b+t
2
b)
α
2
)1−N dtb


Proof: Since ||gxe||2F ∼ gamma (N − 1, 1), the proof
can be achieved by employing Lemma 1 and using the Laplace
transform of the gamma random variable, which is omitted.
A. The Typical Planar Transmitter Case
In this subsection, we consider the scenario where a planar
node seating at the origin, plays as the typical transmitter.
Further, the types of Eves being independent with each other
can be classified into: a) the planar Eves denoted as Φe, and
b) the vehicular Eves denoted as Ψe. A lower bound on the
secrecy probability is given as follows.
Theorem 4: A lower bound on the secrecy probability
8achieved by the typical planar transmitter is
pLsec,p =exp
(
−2λl
∫ +∞
0
dree
−2ue
∫ +∞
0
Λ1(re,te)dte
)
×
exp
(
−2πλe
∫ +∞
0
Λ2(re)redre
)
, (30)
where s , (φ
−1−1)β
N−1 , Λ2 (re) ,
(1 + s)
1−N LsΦb (srαe )LsΨb (srαe )), and Λ1 (re, te) ,
LsΦb
(
s(r2e+t
2
e)
α
2
)
LsΨb
(
s(r2e+t
2
e)
α
2
)
Lsψb(lr=0)
(
s(r2e+t
2
e)
α
2
)
(1+s)N−1
.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
In the following, we consider the nearest Eve only to get an
upper bound on the secrecy probability. Before this, the pdf
of the minimum distance from multiple Eves to the typical
planar transmitter, is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: When the nearest Eve is a vehicular node or a
planar node, the pdf of the minimum distance d∗e from multiple
Eves to the typical planar transmitter is, given by
fd∗e,ε0,p(τ) = 4λlueexp
(
−2λl
∫ τ
0
(
1− e−2ue
√
τ2−r2e
)
dre
)
×
∫ τ
0
τexp
(
−2ue
√
τ2 − r2e
)
√
τ2 − r2e
dree
−λeπτ
2
, (31)
fd∗e,ε1,p(τ)=exp
(
−2λl
∫ τ
0
(
1− e−2ue
√
τ2−r2e
)
dre
)
×
2λeπτexp
(−λeπτ2) . (32)
In the above, ε0,p and ε1,p denote the events that the nearest
Eve is a vehicular node and planar node, respectively, when
the typical transmitter is a planar node.
Proof: On the condition that the typical transmitter is a
planar node, the distribution of d∗e when the nearest Eve is a
vehicular node, is given by
Pr (d∗e ≥ τ, ε0,p)=EΦe
(∫ +∞
τ
∏
e∈Φe
l||e||2>rfd∗e|e∈Ψe(r)dr
)
,
(33)
where fd∗e|e∈Ψe(r) is the conditional pdf of the minimum
distance. Using Re´nyi’s theorem [25, Theorem 2.24] and the
Leibniz Rule, fd∗e|e∈Ψe(r) can be derived as
fd∗e|e∈Ψe(r) = 4λlueexp
(
−2λl
∫ r
0
(
1− e−2ue
√
r2−r2e
)
dre
)
×
∫ r
0
rexp
(
−2ue
√
r2 − r2e
)
√
r2 − r2e
dre. (34)
Then, substituting (34) into (33), we have
fd∗e,ε0,p(τ) = −
dPr (d∗e ≥ τ, ε0,p)
dτ
=− EΦe
(∏
e∈Φe
l||e||2>τ
)
× fd∗e|e∈Ψe(τ)
(a)
= exp
(−λeπτ2) fd∗e|e∈Ψe(τ), (35)
where step (a) is due to the PGFL of the point processes Φe.
The derivation of (32) can be achieved with a similar
procedure, which is omitted for brevity.
The following lemma gives asymptotic analytical results of
the minimum distance d∗e in Lemma 3 under the assumption
that λl → +∞, ue → 0, and the product λlue remains
constant.
Lemma 4: With λl → +∞, ue → 0, and λlue remains
constant, we have the following asymptotic results
lim
λl→+∞,ue→0
fd∗e,ε0,p(τ)=2λlueπτexp
(−(λlue + λe)πτ2) ,
(36)
lim
λl→+∞,ue→0
fd∗e,ε1,p(τ)=2λeπτexp
(−(λlue+λe)πτ2) (37)
Proof: Following the proof of Lemma 2, the asymptotic
result of fd∗e,ε0,p(d) can be derived as
lim
λl→+∞,ue→0
fd∗e,ε0,p(τ)=4λlueexp
(
−4λlue
∫ τ
0
√
τ2−r2edre
)
× e−λeπτ2
∫ τ
0
τ√
τ2 − r2e
dre (38)
Employing [30, eq. (3.249.2) and eq. (3.248.3)], we can obtain
(36).
The derivation of (37) can be achieved with a similar
procedure which is omitted for brevity.
Remark 2: Lemma 4 shows that the pdf of the minimum
distance from multiple Eves to the typical planar transmitter
converges to the one of the network modeled by a 2D PPP
with intensity λlue+λe, under the assumption that λl → +∞,
ue → 0, and λlue remains constant.
With Lemma 3, an upper bound on the secrecy probability
is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 5: On the condition that the typical transmitter is
a planar node, by considering the nearest Eve only, an upper
bound on the secrecy probability is given by
pUsec,p = 1−
∫ +∞
0 LsΨb (sτα)LsΦb (sτα) fd∗e,ε1,p(τ)dτ
(1 + s)
N−1
−∫ +∞
0
LsΨb (sτα)LsΦb (sτα)Lsψb(lr=0) (sτα) fd∗e,ε0,p(τ)dτ
(1 + s)
N−1
,
(39)
where s , (φ
−1−1)β
N−1 , fd∗e,ε0,p(τ) and fd∗e,ε1,p(τ) are given in
(31) and (32), respectively.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.
B. The Typical Vehicular Transmitter Case
In this subsection, we consider the scenario where a vehic-
ular node seating at the origin, plays as the typical transmitter.
The typical road lo passes through the origin with r = 0 and
θ = 0, since the PLP is rotation-invariant. Under the Palm
distribution, the additional road lo increases the set of Eves
by ψe(lo) , due to the Palm distributions, which would make
the secrecy probability analysis more complicated, compared
with the typical planar transmitter case. Furthermore, the types
9of Eves being independent with each other can be classified
into: a) the planar Eves denoted as Φe; b) the vehicular Eves
on the road lo denoted as ψe(lo); c) the vehicular Eves on
other roads denoted as Ψe. A lower bound on the secrecy
probability is given as follows.
Theorem 6: A lower bound pLsec,v on the secrecy probability
achieved by the typical vehicular transmitter, is given by
pLsec,v =exp
(
−λl
π
∫ 2π
0
dθe
∫ +∞
0
dree
−ue
∫ +∞
−∞
Λ1(re,te,θe)dte
)
× exp
(
−λe
∫ 2π
0
∫ +∞
0
Λ2(re, θe)redredθe
)
× exp
(
−2ue
∫ +∞
0
Λ3(te)dte
)
, (40)
where s , (φ
−1−1)β
N−1 , h(θe) , resin(θe)− tecos (θe), and
Λ1 (re, te, θe) ,
LsΦb
(
s(r2e + t
2
e)
α
2
)LsΨb (s(r2e + t2e)α2 )
(1 + s)
N−1
×
Lsψb(lr=0)
(
s(r2e + t
2
e)
α
2
)Ls
ψb(lr=h(θe))
(
s(r2e + t
2
e)
α
2
)
, (41)
Λ2 (re, θe) ,
LsΦb (srαe )LsΨb (srαe )Lsψb(lr=resin(θe)) (sr
α
e )
(1 + s)
N−1
,
Λ3 (te) ,
LsΦb (stαe )LsΨb (stαe )Lsψb(lr=0) (stαe )
(1 + s)
N−1
. (42)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E.
Due to the multiple integration, the lower bound
given in Theorem 6 is computationally expensive. For
alleviating the computational complexity, we simplify
the terms Λ1 (re, te, θe) and Λ2 (re, θe) by removing
Ls
ψb(lr=h(θe))
(
s(r2e + t
2
e)
α
2
)
and Ls
ψb(lr=resin(θe))
(srαe ),
thereby obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4: An easy-to-compute lower bound pˇLsec,v on
the secrecy probability achieved by the typical vehicular
transmitter, is given by
pˇLsec,v = exp
(
−2λl
∫ +∞
0
dree
−ue
∫ +∞
−∞
Λˇ1(re,te)dte
)
×
exp
(
−2πλe
∫ +∞
0
Λˇ2(re)redre − 2ue
∫ +∞
0
Λ3(te)dte
)
,
(43)
where s , (φ
−1−1)β
N−1 , Λ3(te) is given in (42), and
Λˇ1 (re, te) , (1 + s)
1−N LsΦb
(
s(r2e + t
2
e)
α
2
)×
LsΨb
(
s(r2e + t
2
e)
α
2
)Lsψb(lr=0) (s(r2e + t2e)α2 ) ,
Λˇ2 (re) , (1 + s)
1−N LsΦb (srαe )LsΨb (srαe ) . (44)
Similar to Theorem 5, we derive an upper bound on the
secrecy probability, when considering the nearest Eve only.
As a preliminary, the pdf of the minimum distance from
multiple Eves to the typical vehicular transmitter is given in
the following lemma.
Lemma 5: When the nearest Eve is a vehicular node but
is not on the road lo, is a vehicular node on the road lo, or
is a planar node, the pdf of the minimum distance d∗e from
multiple Eves to the typical vehicular transmitter is given by
fd∗e,ε0,v (τ) = 4λluee
−2λl
∫
τ
0
(
1−e
−2ue
√
τ2−r2e
)
dre
×∫ τ
0
τexp
(
−2ue
√
τ2 − r2e
)
√
τ2 − r2e
dree
−λeπτ
2−2ueτ , (45)
fd∗e,ε1,v (τ)=2ueexp
(−2ueτ − λeπτ2)×
exp
(
−2λl
∫ τ
0
(
1− e−2ue
√
τ2−r2e
)
dre
)
, (46)
fd∗e,ε2,v (τ)=exp
(
−2λl
∫ τ
0
(
1− e−2ue
√
τ2−r2e
)
dre − 2ueτ
)
× 2λeπτexp
(−λeπτ2) . (47)
Note that ε0,v, ε1,v, and ε2,v, respectively, denote the event
that the nearest Eve is a vehicular node but is not on the road
lo, is a vehicular node on the road lo, or is a planar node.
Proof: The proof can be achieved by following the proof
of Lemma 3, which is omitted.
Theorem 7: On the condition that the typical transmitter is
a vehicular node, considering the nearest Eve only, an upper
bound pUsec,v on the secrecy probability, is given by (48) at the
top of the next page, where s , (φ
−1−1)β
N−1 , hˆ(θ
∗
e) , τsin(θ
∗
e),
fd∗e,ε0,v (τ), fd∗e,ε1,v (τ), and fd∗e,ε2,v (τ) are given in Lemma 5.
Proof: The proof can be achieved by following the proof
of Theorem 5. Details are omitted for brevity.
It is evident that Ls
ψb(lr=hˆ(θ∗e )
) (sτ
α) > Ls
ψb(lr=0)
(sτα),
then, an upper bound on pUsec,v i.e., pˇ
U
sec,v, can be obtained
by replacing Lsψb(lr=hˆ(θ∗e )) (sτ
α) with Lsψb(lr=0) (sτα) in (48).
Inspired by this, we build a computationally efficient upper
bound, which is given in the following corollary.
Corollary 5: An easy to compute upper bound on the se-
crecy probability achieved by the typical vehicular transmitter
is given by (49) at the top of the next page.
By using total probability law [25], the bounds on the
secrecy probability are given as follows.
Corollary 6: The secrecy probability can be bounded by
pˇLsec,̺ppˇ
L
sec,p + ̺v pˇ
L
sec,v ≤ pc ≤ ̺ppˇUsec,p + ̺v pˇUsec,v , pˇUsec,
(50)
where ̺p , λbλb+ubλl denotes the probability that the typical
transmitter is a planar node, and ̺v , ubλlλb+ubλl denotes the
probability that the typical transmitter is a vehicular node.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the simulation results of the coverage
probability and secrecy probability are provided for validating
the theoretical results in Corollary 2 and Corollary 6. Then,
we evaluate the impact of the network parameters on the
secrecy performance of the C-V2X network by simulations.
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pUsec,v=1−(1 + s)1−N
∫ 2π
0
dθ∗e
2π
∫ +∞
0
LsΨb (sτα)LsΦb (sτα)Lsψb(lr=0) (sτα)Lsψb(lr=hˆ(θ∗e )) (sτ
α) fd∗e,ε0,v (τ)dτ
− (1 + s)1−N
∫ +∞
0
(
LsΨb (sτα)LsΦb (sτα)Lsψb(lr=0) (sτα)
)
fd∗e,ε1,v (τ)dτ
− (1 + s)1−N
∫ 2π
0
dθ∗e
2π
∫ +∞
0
(
LsΨb (sτα)LsΦb (sτα)Lsψb(lr=hˆ(θ∗e )) (sτ
α)
)
fd∗e,ε2,v (τ)dτ, (48)
pˇUsec,v =1−
∫+∞
0 LΨb (sτα)LΦb (sτα)
(Lψb(lr=0) (sτα))2 fd∗e,ε0,v (τ)dτ
(1 + s)
N−1
−
∫ +∞
0 LsΨb (sτα)LsΦb (sτα)Lsψb(lr=0) (sτα) fd∗e,ε1,v (τ)dτ
(1 + s)
N−1
−
∫ +∞
0 LΨb (sτα)LsΦb (sτα)Lsψb(lr=0) (sτα) fd∗e,ε2,v (τ)dτ
(1 + s)
N−1
. (49)
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Fig. 2. Validation of the analytical result of coverage probability in Corollary
2 with φ = 0.6, α = 2.3, λb = 10
−5, λl = 5× 10
−4, ub = 10
−3 .
Fig. 2 shows the approximate coverage probability given
in (25) and the simulation results versus the SIR threshold
γ for different numbers of antennas, N . Simulation results
validate the accuracy of the analytical result, and show that
the approximate analytical result in (25) coincides with the
simulation results very well, when N increases from 2 to 6.
In Fig. 3, we plot the simulation results of the secrecy
probability versus the bounds given in Corollary 6. From Fig.
3, we can find that pˇLsec coincides with the simulation results
very well, which validates the tightness of the lower bound
pˇLsec. The upper bound pˇ
U
sec is loose, especially when the SIR
threshold is lower than 0 dB.
For validating the tightness of the lower bound pˇLsec further,
we plot the simulation results of the secrecy probability pˇLsec
versus λ with λe = ue = λ in Fig. 4. With the increasing λ,
the number of Eves eavesdropping the confidential information
from the typical vehicular transmitter increases, and the se-
crecy probability decreases. From the simulation results in Fig.
4, we can find that pˇLsec coincides with the simulation results
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Fig. 3. Validation of the tightness of the lower bound and upper bound in
Corollary 8 with parameters N = 2, φ = 0.6, λl = 10
−4, ub = 10
−4, ue =
10−4, λb = 10
−5, λe = 10−4.
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Fig. 4. Validation of the lower bound pˇLsec versus the intensity λ for φ =
0.6, α = 3, λl = ub = λb = 10
−4, λe = ue = λ.
very well over the whole range of λ, which has validated the
tightness of the lower bound further.
Since the simulation results in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 have vali-
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Fig. 5. The effective secrecy throughput of the typical transmitter and receiver
pair versus φ for N = 2, α = 2.3, λb = 10
−5, λl = 5× 10
−4, ub = ue =
10−3, λe = 10−4;
dated the analytical results given in Corollary 2 and Corollary
6, respectively, according to Definition 1, the analytical result
of the effective secrecy throughput is
η = Rs (κppc,p + κvpc,v) pˇ
L
sec. (51)
Setting γ = 10dB and β = 0dB, Rs = log2 (1 + γ) −
log2 (1 + β) and the effective secrecy throughput is given by
(51). The following simulation results of the effective secrecy
throughput are theoretical results given in (51).
Fig. 5 plots the effective secrecy throughput versus the
power allocation ratio φ for the worst-case assumption adopted
in this work and an optimistic assumption. For the worst-
case assumption, this work performs the secrecy performance
analysis by overestimating the multi-user decodability of Eves.
Instead, a more optimistic assumption can be built by under-
estimating the multi-user decodability of Eves, where both
information signals and AN transmitted by transmitters act
as the interference to deteriorate the wiretapping capability
of Eves. First, for the worst-case assumption, Fig. 5 shows
that the effective secrecy throughput may be a concave/quais-
concave function of φ, and there is a unique optimal φ for
maximizing the effective secrecy throughput. The optimal
φ ≈ 0.7, which means that most of the power is allocated
to the confidential information. Furthermore, the simulation
results show that the optimal φ remains unchanged approxi-
mately, with the increasing number of antennas. Second, for
the optimistic assumption, with the increasing φ, the C-V2X
network gradually achieves a better secrecy performance than
the one under the worst-case assumption. Furthermore, with
the increasing φ, its achievable secrecy throughput converges
to a steady constant, which shows that even for the optimistic
assumption, increasing the information signal power may not
always benefit the secrecy performance due to the information
leakage.
Fig. 6 shows the change trend of the effective secrecy
throughput with the increasing intensity of Eves. Obviously,
the effective secrecy throughput decreases with the increasing
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Fig. 6. The effective secrecy throughput of the typical transmitter and receiver
pair versus the intensity of eavesdroppers λ for N = 5, φ = 0.6, α = 2.3,
λb = 10
−5, λl = 5× 10
−4, ub = 10
−3, λe = λ, ue = 5× λ.
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Fig. 7. The effective secrecy throughput of the typical transmitter and receiver
pair versus the number antennas equipped at each transmitter N for φ =
0.6, α = 2.3, λe = 10−3, ue = 10−2 ;
λ. When N = 2, the effective secrecy throughput decreases by
0.37 bits/s/Hz for λ changing from 10−4 to 10−3. But, when
N = 5, the effective secrecy throughput only decreases by
about 0.15 bits/s/Hz. Then, we can make a conclusion that the
decreasing rate of the effective secrecy throughput decreases
with the increasing N , and a larger antenna array can improve
the robustness of the secure transmission scheme.
Fig. 7 shows the change trend of the effective secrecy
throughput with the increasing number of antennas N . Just
as the simulation results in Fig. 6, more numbers of antennas
employed would result in a better secrecy performance. But,
the top simulation curves in Fig. 7 show that the growing
rate of the effective secrecy throughput decreases when N
increases from 6 to 8. This shows that the effective secrecy
throughput can not increase linearly with N all the time
and there is a best tradeoff between improving the secrecy
performance and the system complexity.
Fig. 8 shows the effective secrecy throughput versus the
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Fig. 8. The effective secrecy throughput of the typical transmitter and receiver
pair versus the intensity of transmitters for N = 4, λb = λ, ub = 5λ
φ = 0.6, α = 2.3, λl = 5× 10
−4.
intensity of transmitters. With the increasing intensity of
transmitters, the effective secrecy throughput increases, due
to the decreasing distance between transmitter and receiver,
and the increasing power of AN. But, from the simulation
results, we can find that the secrecy performance gain obtained
by increasing intensity of transmitters is small. Furthermore,
when the intensity of Eves is small, the secrecy performance
gains brought by making the network denser, is lower than the
network with a larger intensity of Eves.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we built a theoretical framework for analyzing
the PLS of AN assisted C-V2X networks by leveraging the
Cox point process. Closed-form analytical expressions of cov-
erage probability and secrecy probability were derived, which
facilitate the evaluation of the effective secrecy throughput.
The simulation results show the impact of network parameters
on the achievable secrecy performance. In particular, the
effective secrecy throughput may be a concave/quasi-concave
function of the power allocation coefficient, and the capacity
for suppressing eavesdropping increases with the number of
transmit antennas.
This work may have some potential extensions as follows.
First, the spatial distribution of vehicles over a road is built by
a static PPP model in this work. It is interesting to extend the
spatial model to a stochastic geometry-based mobility model
for characterizing the impact of the mobility of vehicles on
the secrecy performance. Moreover, in this work, we just
studied the secrecy performance of unicast communication.
In practical systems, different communication modes coexist.
Therefore, it is important to extend the secrecy performance
analysis to a network with multiple communication modes,
e.g., broadcast, unicast and multicast communications.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
On the condition that the typical user is a planar node, the
coverage probability in (14) is given by
pˆc,p=EΦb
(∑
x∈Φb
Pr (SIRx≥γ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pˆc,p,1
+EΨb
(∑
x∈Ψb
Pr (SIRx≥γ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pˆc,p,2
.
(52)
The first part of (52), pˆc,p,1, is the coverage probability when
the typical user is associated with a planar transmitter, which
can be derived as (53) at the top of the next page, where step
(a) is obtained by employing Campbell’s theorem for sums
over the PPP Φb [25, Theorem 4.1] and step (b) is due to [31,
Theorem 1]. The second part of (52), pˆc,p,2, is the coverage
probability when the typical user is associated with a vehicular
transmitter, which can be derived as (54) at the top of the next
page.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
On the condition that the typical user is a vehicular node,
the analytical result of the coverage probability in (14) can be
derived as
pˆc,v=EΦb
(∑
x∈Φb
Pr (SIRx ≥ γ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pˆc,v,1
+EΨb
(∑
x∈Ψb
Pr (SIRx ≥ γ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pˆc,v,2
+Eψb(lr=0)

 ∑
x∈ψb(lr=0)
Pr (SIRx ≥ γ)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
pˆc,v,3
. (55)
The first part of (55), pˆc,v,1, is the coverage probability
when the typical user is associated with a planar transmitter.
Following the derivation in (53) and defining Ω1 , Ψb+Φb+
ψ (lr=0), we have
pˆc,v,1=2πλb
∫ +∞
0
Pr

 φr−α||fx||2F∑
y∈Ω1
PyD
−α
yo
≥γ

 rdr. (56)
The second part of (55), pˆc,v,2, is the coverage probability
when the typical user is associated with a vehicular transmitter.
Following the derivation in (54) and defining Ω2 , Ψb+Φb+
ψ(lr=rb) + ψ(lr=0), we have
pˆc,v,2=4λlub
∫ +∞
0
drb
∫ +∞
0
Pr


φ
(r2b+t2b)
α
2
||fx||2F∑
y∈Ω2
PyD
−α
yo
≥γ

dtb.
(57)
The third part of (55), pˆc,v,3, is the coverage probability
when the typical user is associated with a vehicular trans-
mitter on the road lo. Employing the Campbell’s theorem for
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pˆc,p,1
(a)
=2πλb
∫ +∞
0
Pr

 φr−α||fx||2F∑
y∈{Ψb+Φb}
PyD
−α
yo
≥γ

 rdr(b)=2πλb ∫ +∞
0
N−1∑
n=0
[
(−sp)n
n!
dn
dsnp
(LcΨb(sp)LcΦb (sp))
]
sp=γrαφ−1
rdr,
(53)
pˆc,p,2 = EΞl

 ∑
{rb,θb}∈Ξl
E

 ∑
tb∈lrb,θb
Pr

 φ
(
r2b + t
2
b
)−α2 ||fx||2F∑
y∈{Ψb+Φb+ψ(lr=rb)}
PyD
−α
yo
≥ γ






=4λlub
∫ +∞
0
drb
∫ +∞
0
dtb
N−1∑
n=0
[
(−sv)n
n!
dn
dsnv
(
LcΨb(sv)LcΦb(sv)Lcψb(lr=rb)(sv)
)]
sv=φ−1(r2b+t2b)
α
2 γ
. (54)
sums over the point process ψb (lr=0) [25, Theorem 4.1] and
defining Ω3 , Ψb +Φb + ψ (lr=0), we have
pˆc,v,3=2ub
∫ +∞
0
Pr

 φt−αb ||fx||2F∑
y∈Ω3
PyD
−α
yo
≥ γ

 dtb. (58)
Finally, employing Corollary 1, the exact analytical result
is given as (59) at the top of the next page. Then, just as
deriving the approximate result in Theorem 2, employing the
lower bound on the cdf of the gamma random variable [29],
the approximate result given in (24) can be obtained directly.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The secrecy probability can be expressed as
Pr
(
max
e∈(Φe+Ψe)
SIRe ≤ β
)
= E


∏
e∈Ψe
Pr (SIRe ≤ β)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
×
∏
e∈Φe
Pr (SIRe ≤ β)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)

 . (60)
The expectation over the product (I) can be derived as (61)
at the top of the next page, where ∆b,p , Φb ∪Ψb ∪ ψb(le).
At step (a), the distance between the typical planar transmitter
and the vehicular Eve is
√
r2e + t
2
e, which is illustrated in Fig.
1, where re is the perpendicular distance from the typical
transmitter located at the origin to the road, and te denotes
the distance of the vehicular Eve from the projection of the
origin onto the road, i.e., o′. Notice that under the condition
that e ∈ Ψe, the eavesdropper is on a road which is denoted
as le and the corresponding point on the representation space
is denoted as (re, θe). Therefore, for each vehicular Eve at
e ∈ Ψe, the interference received at Eve comes from multiple
planar transmitters, vehicular transmitters on the road le, and
vehicular transmitters on the other roads. Step (b) is obtained
by using the PGFL of the point process ψ(lre,θe) and the point
process Ξl [25, Theorem 4.9]. Step (c) is due to the Jensen’s
inequality.
Employing the PGFL of Φe, the expectation over the
product (II) can be derived as
E
(∏
e∈Φe
Pr (SIRe ≤ β)
)
=
e
−2λeπ
∫+∞
0
Pr

 φ(N−1)1−φ |qe|2r−αe
||goe||
2
F
r
−α
e +
∑
x∈{Φb+Ψb}
||gxe||
2
F
D
−α
xe
≥β

redre
.
(62)
Since the planar Eve does not have to locate at any road, the
planar Eve only suffers the interference from the transmitters
at Φb ∪Ψb.
For obtaining the secrecy probability, the complementary
cumulative distribution function (ccdf) of the SIR received by
Eve should be derived first. Defining s , (φ
−1−1)β
N−1 , the ccdf in
(61) is given as (63) at the top of the next page. Step (a) is due
to the Laplace transform of the gamma random variable, and
step (b) is due to that Φb, Ψb, and ψ(lr=0) are all independent.
Applying Corollary 3, Laplace transforms (i)-(iii) in (63)
can be derived. Substituting the analytical result of (63) into
(61), the analytical result of E
( ∏
e∈Ψe
Pr (SIRe ≤ β)
)
can be
obtained. With the same procedures, the analytical result of
E
( ∏
e∈Φe
Pr (SIRe ≤ β)
)
can be obtained. Then, the secrecy
probability can be derived with (60).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
On the condition that the typical transmitter is a planar node,
the secrecy probability is derived by considering two events:
14
pc,p = 4λlub
∫ +∞
0
drb
∫ +∞
dtb
[
N−1∑
n=0
(−sv)n dn
n!dsnv
(
LcΦb(sv)Lcψ(lr=rb)(sv)L
c
ψ(lr=0)
(sv)LcΨb(sv)
)]
sv=φ−1(r2b+t2b)
α/2
γ
+ 2πλb
∫ +∞
0
rdr
N−1∑
n=0
[
(−sp)n
n!
dn
dsnp
(
LcΨb(sp)Lcψ(lr=0)(sp)LcΦb(sp)
)]
sp=φ−1rαγ
+ 2ub
∫ +∞
0
dtb
N−1∑
n=0
[
(−slo)n
n!
dn
dsnlo
(
LcΨb(slo)Lcψ(lr=0)(slo)LcΦb (slo)
)]
slo=φ
−1tαb γ
. (59)
E
( ∏
e∈Ψe
Pr (SIRe ≤ β)
)
(a)
=E

 ∏
(re,θe)∈Ξl
E

 ∏
te∈ψ(lre,θe )
Pr

 φ|qe|2
(
r2e + t
2
e
)−α2
(1−φ)||goe||2F (r
2
e+t
2
e)
−α
2
N−1 +
∑
x∈∆b,p
(1−u)||gxe||2FD
−α
xe
N−1
≤β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∆b,p






(b)
= E

exp

−
λl
π
∫ 2π
0
dθe
∫ +∞
0
dree
−2ue
∫+∞
0
Pr


φ(N−1)
1−φ
|qe|
2(r2e+t2e)
−α
2
||goe||
2
F (r
2
e+t
2
e)
−α
2 +
∑
x∈∆b,p
||gxe||
2
F
D
−α
xe
≥β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆b,p

dte




(c)
' exp

−2λl
∫ +∞
0
dree
−2ue
∫ +∞
0
Pr


φ(N−1)
1−φ
|qe|
2(r2e+t2e)
−α
2
||goe||
2
F (r
2
e+t
2
e)
−α
2 +
∑
x∈∆b,p
||gxe||
2
F
D
−α
xe
≥β

dte

 , (61)
Pr

 φ|qe|2
(
r2e + t
2
e
)−α2
1−φ
(N−1)(r2e+t
2
e)
α
2
||goe||2F +
∑
x∈{Φb+Ψb+ψ(le)}
(1−φ)||gxe||2FD
−α
xe
(N−1)
≥ β

 (a)=
exp
(
−
(
s
(
r2e + t
2
e
)α
2
∑
x∈{Φb+Ψb+ψ(le)}
||gxe||2FD−αxe
))
(
1 + β φ
−1−1
N−1
)N−1
(b)
=
(
1 + β
φ−1 − 1
N − 1
)1−N
LsΦb
(
s
(
r2e + t
2
e
)α
2
)
(i)
LsΨb
(
s
(
r2e + t
2
e
)α
2
)
(ii)
Lsψb(lr=0)
(
s
(
r2e + t
2
e
)α
2
)
(iii)
. (63)
1) the nearest Eve is a vehicular node, which is denoted by
ε0,p; 2) the nearest Eve is a planar node, which is denoted
as ε1,p. Then, considering the nearest Eve only, the secrecy
probability pLsec,p can be established as (64) at the previous
page.
Let’s derive the first expectation pLsec,v,1 in (64).
pLsec,p,1 =
∫ +∞
0
(
1−
LsΨb (sτα)LsΦb (sτα)Lsψb(lr=0) (sτα)
(1 + s)
N−1
)
× fd∗e,ε0,p(τ)dτ, (65)
where fd∗e,ε0,p(τ) is given in (31). With Corollary 3, the
analytical result of pLsec,v,1 can be obtained. Second, let’s
derive the second expectation pLsec,p,2 in (64).
pLsec,p,2 =
∫ +∞
0
(
1− L
s
Ψb
(sτα)LsΦb (sτα)
(1 + s)
N−1
)
fd∗e,ε1,p(τ)dτ,
(66)
where fd∗e,ε1,p(τ) has been given in (32). Employing Corollary
3, the analytical result of pLsec,p,2 can be obtained. Finally
substituting (65) and (66) into (64), the analytical result of
pLsec,p can be obtained.
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pLsec,p = Ed∗e

Pr

 φ|qe|2 (d∗e)−α(1−φ)||goe||2F (d∗e)−α
N−1 +
∑
x∈{Φb+Ψb+ψb(le)}
(1−φ)||gxe||2FD
−α
xe
N−1
≤ β, ε0,p




︸ ︷︷ ︸
pLsec,p,1
+ Ed∗e

Pr

 φ|qe|2 (d∗e)−α(1−φ)||goe||2F (d∗e)−α
N−1 +
∑
x∈{Φb+Ψb}
(1−φ)||gxe||2FD
−α
xe
N−1
≤ β, ε1,p




︸ ︷︷ ︸
pLsec,p,2
. (64)
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Fig. 9. Illustration of the relative location, where o′ is the projection of the
origin o onto the road le and oˆ is the projection of the vehicular Eve’s location
onto the road lo. h(θe) is the perpendicular distance from the vehicular Eve
to the road lo.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
The secrecy probability is
Pr
(
max
e∈(Φe+Ψe+ψe(lo))
SIRe≤β
)
=E


∏
e∈Ψe
Pr (SIRe≤β)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
×
∏
e∈Φe
Pr (SIRe≤β)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
∏
e∈ψe(lo)
Pr (SIRe≤β)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(III)

 . (67)
Following the procedures in (61), a lower bound on
the expectation over the product (I) in (67) can be de-
rived as (68) at the top of the next page, where ∆b,v ,
Φb ∪Ψb ∪ ψb(le) ∪ ψb(lo).
Employing the PGFL of Φe, a lower bound on the expec-
tation over the product (II) in (67) is given by
E
(∏
e∈Φe
Pr (SIRe ≤ β)
)
'
e
−2λeπ
∫ +∞
0
Pr


φ(N−1)
1−φ
|qe|
2r−αe
||goe||
2
F
rαe
+
∑
x∈{Φb+Ψb+ψb(lo)}
||gxe||
2
F
Dαxe
≥β

redre
.
(69)
Employing the PGFL of ψe (lo), a lower bound on the
expectation over the product (III) in (67) can be derived as
E

 ∏
e∈ψe(lo)
Pr (SIRe ≤ β)

'
e
−2ue
∫ +∞
0
Pr


φ(N−1)
1−φ
|qe|
2t−αe
||goe||
2
F
tαe
+
∑
x∈{Φb+Ψb+ψb(lo)}
||gxe||
2
F
Dαxe
≥β

dte
. (70)
Notice that under the condition that e ∈ ψe(lo), the eavesdrop-
pers are on the same road as the typical vehicular transmitter.
Therefore, such eavesdroppers would suffer the interference
from the transmitters at Φb ∪Ψb ∪ ψb(lo).
For obtaining the analytical result of the secrecy probability,
the ccdf of the SIR received by Eve should be derived first.
Defining s ,
(φ−1−1)(r2e+t2e)
α
2 β
N−1 , and following the proce-
dures in (63), the ccdf in (68) can be derived as (71) at the
top of the next page, where h(θe) is the perpendicular distance
from the vehicular Eve to lo, as illustrated in Fig. 9.
Applying Corollary 3, the analytical results of the Laplace
transforms (i)-(iii) in (71) can be obtained. For deriving the
Laplace transform (iv) in (71), h(θe) should be derived firstly.
As illustrated in Fig. 9, h(θe) = resin(θe)− tecos(θe), where
te > 0 when the vehicular Eve is at the right of o
′, otherwise,
te < 0. Employing Corollary 3, the analytical result of
Lsψb(lr=h(θe))(s) can be obtained. Then, substituting (71) into
(68), the analytical result of E
( ∏
e∈Ψe
Pr (SIRe ≤ β)
)
can be
obtained.
With similar procedures, the analytical results of
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E
( ∏
e∈Ψe
Pr (SIRe ≤ β)
)
'exp

−
λl
π
∫ 2π
0
dθe
∫ +∞
0
dree
−ue
∫+∞
−∞
Pr


φ(N−1)
1−φ
|qe|
2(r2e+t2e)
−α
2
||goe||
2
F (r
2
e+t
2
e)
−α
2 +
∑
x∈∆b,v
||gxe||
2
F
D
−α
xe
≥β

dte

 , (68)
Pr

 φ|qe|2
(
r2e + t
2
e
)−α2
(1−φ)||goe||2F
(N−1)(r2e+t
2
e)
α
2
+
∑
x∈{Φb+Ψb+ψb(le)+ψb(lo)}
(1−u)||gxe||2FD
−α
xe
(N−1)
≥ β

=
(i)
LsΦb (s)
(ii)
LsΨb(s)
(iii)
Ls
ψb(lr=0)
(s)
(iv)
Ls
ψb(lr=h(θe))
(s)(
1 + β φ
−1−1
N−1
)N−1 , (71)
∏
e∈Φe
Pr (SIRe ≤ β) and
∏
e∈ψe(lo)
Pr (SIRe ≤ β) can be
obtained and the detailed derivations are omitted due to the
space limitation. Substituting (68), (69) and (70) into (67), a
lower bound on the secrecy probability can be obtained.
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